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This paper reviews some of the literature on the philosophy of quantum mechanics.             
The publications involved tend to follow similar patterns of first identifying the            
mysteries, puzzles or paradoxes of the quantum world, and then discussing the            
existing interpretations of these matters, before the authors produce their own           
interpretations, or side with one of the existing views. The paper will show that all               
interpretations of quantum mechanics involve elements of apparent weirdness.         
They suggest that the quantum world, and possibly our macro world, exists or             
behaves in a way quite contrary to the way we normally imagine they should. The               
paper will also show how many of the writers on quantum mechanics            
misunderstand idealism in the macro world as proposed by philosophers such as            
George Berkeley, David Hume, Immanuel Kant and John Stuart Mill and           
misunderstand the concept of the observer dependent universe. The paper          
concludes by examining the similarities between the idealist view of the macro            
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world and the Copenhagen Interpretation of the quantum world and suggests that as             
the Copenhagen Interpretation provides a view of the quantum world that is            
consistent with the macro world then the Copenhagen Interpretation should be the            
preferred view of the quantum world. 
 
The Problems of Quantum Mechanics 
 
Quantum mechanics describes to us the strange world of subatomic          
particles. The very names of some of the publications on quantum mechanics gives             
some idea of the extraordinary nature of quantum mechanics. ​The Mystery of the             
Quantum World, Where does the weirdness go?, Particles and Paradoxes, The           
Ghost in the Atom, Quantum Physics: Illusion or Reality ​gives some idea of the              
extraordinary nature of the quantum world. This strangeness relates to certain           
matters which emerge from various experiments performed using quantum entities          
and electromagnetic energy. There are a number of such experiments, but there are             
six main experiments. They are the double slit experiment, the EPR-Aspect           
experiment, the Stern-Gerlach experiments, polarization experiments, barrier       
experiments involving quantum tunneling and a thought experiment known as the           
Schrodinger's cat experiment. Different publications handle these experiments        
differently, some emphasizing one, some emphasizing others. 
The simplest explanation of the experiments is given in ​Where does the            
weirdness go? in which all except the polarization and barrier experiments are            
considered. In that book David Lindley considers the results of these experiments            
are weird and bewildering rather than paradoxical in that they are not internally             
contradictory. What they contradict is our normal view of reality. However there is             
one genuine paradox in quantum mechanics. This concerns the question of how            
measurements can be made; how measurements turn indeterminate quantum         
systems into definite states and how measuring devices may exist in definite states,             
when the quantum systems they are made of, are in indefinite states unless             
observed. (Lindley, 1997, 163-165). 
A more detailed statement of the difficulties the quantum world presents us            
with, is provided by Peter Gibbins in his book ​Particles and Paradoxes. ​That             
statement is as follows: 
 
“Does quantum mechanics describe individual quantum systems or only the          
statistical behavior of ensembles of quantum systems? 
Are quantum systems waves, or particles, both or neither? 
How should we understand the uncertainty principle? 
What does probability mean in quantum mechanics? 
Do individual quantum systems have precise values for all their dynamical           
variables? 
Do electrons have trajectories? 
Can there be a deterministic hidden variables underpinning of quantum mechanics? 
How are we to understand measurement in quantum mechanics? 
Is quantum mechanics a non-local theory? 
Are there genuine paradoxes in quantum mechanics, how can they be resolved? 
Can they be resolved by restricting our reasoning about individual systems to            
quantum logic? 
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Is quantum logic a logic?” (Gibbins, 1987, 13-14) 
 
The last three questions asked by Gibbins relate particularly to his book which             
specifically deals with quantum logic, a system of logic that varies somewhat from             
the classical logic familiar to philosophers. The replacement of classical logic with            
a special quantum logic may seem a desperate remedy for the peculiarities of the              
quantum world but all explanations as to what happens in the quantum world have              
an aura of desperation about them. 
There are of course many other interpretations, of what constitutes the           
strangeness of the quantum world. Peter Forrest describes some of them in Chapter             
3 ​of his book ​Quantum Metaphysics ​under the heading "Puzzles and Problems".            
The first puzzle he raises is that concerning Schrodinger's Cat which is a thought              
experiment concerning the relationship between quantum theory and macroscopic         
objects. The puzzle concerns a macroscopic object such as a cat which according to              
quantum theory as applied in the thought experiment is in a state of being neither               
dead nor alive. Such a state is of course contrary to the way we normally               
experience cats. Forrest's version of Schrodinger's cat uses plaster cats that are            
blown up by a terrorist organization but the puzzle remains as to how his plaster               
cats can be both blown up (e.g. dead) and not blown up (e.g. alive) at the same                 
time. 
Forrest then raises the problem of there being two quite different sorts of             
dynamics for quantum systems. Systems may behave in accordance with          
Schrodinger dynamics, or when an observation is made, in accordance with von            
Neumann dynamics. This, Forrest says, raises problems of incoherence,         
demarcation and complexity. Incoherence arises as measurements are meant to          
obey von Neumann dynamics and yet measurements are simply physical          
interactions of quantum systems and as such should obey Schrodinger dynamics.           
Demarcation is the problem of where to draw the line between the von Neumann              
dynamics and Schrodinger dynamics and complexity concerns having two         
dynamics for two different situations while our intuition is that there should be a              
single account of the physical world. 
Forrest’s third problem is that of veridicality. What should we regard as            
truth in quantum theory'? Should truth be based on a "realist" basis or some              
"idealist" or "phenomenalist" basis or on some statistical basis. Forrest’s fourth           
problem concerns the double slit experiment and the problems revealed by that            
experiment. His fifth problem concerns whether or not it is possible for an electron              
to have a precise position and momentum at the same time, apart from             
measurement problems such as the uncertainty principle. The sixth problem          
concerns problems involving quantum systems that are in a mixture of states for             
example some having spin up and some having spin down. The seventh problem             
concerns action at a distance which Forrest considers in relation to both the double              
slit experiment and the EPR/Aspect experiment. 
John Gribbin, in ​Schrodinger’s Kittens, presents his understanding of the          
problems of quantum mechanics in the prologue to his book; under the heading             
"The problem". Gribbin mainly illustrates the problems by reference to the double            
slit experiment in which light is sent through a screen with two slits and produces a                
pattern of light and dark patches on a second screen which shows light as a wave.                
The light and dark patches are the result of interference between light waves some              
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of which reinforce each other to produce the light patches and others cancel each              
other out to produce the dark patches. If adjustments are made to the experiments              
such as closing a slit or placing a detector at one of the slits, light can be shown to                   
consist of particles known as photons. Photons are indivisible and are the smallest             
bits of light possible. One problem is why should light suddenly change from wave              
to particles when a detector is placed at one of the slits and why should opening                
and closing slits cause light to change from wave to particle and vice versa? 
If light is sent through the experiment a single photon at a time, then again                
we see the pattern of light and dark patches considered to be caused by light waves                
interfering with each other. This leads to another of the problems raised by John              
Gribbin. How does the single indivisible photon go through both holes at once so              
as to produce the interference pattern on the second screen. A further problem is              
how does each individual photon know where to land on the second screen? Why              
doesn't each photon follow the path of the previous photon and end up on the same                
spot as the previous photon? Furthermore these effects are not limited to photons             
but apply to other quantum entities, such as electrons, protons and neutrons and             
atoms. The problem also arises that the results given by the double slit experiment              
do not show up in the macro world. If one threw balls through holes in a wall one                  
would not observe balls piling up in a pattern similar to the way quantum entities               
hit the second screen in the double slit experiment. Does this mean there is some               
level at which the rules of the quantum world cease to apply and if so why are there                  
two sets of rules, one for the quantum world and one for the macro world. 
An additional problem raised by Gribbin is that of non-locality. This is            
shown in the double slit experiment when a quantum entity passes through one             
hole of the first screen behaves differently (eg like a wave if the other hole is open,                 
like a particle if it is closed) depending on whether the other hole is open or closed.                 
How does the quantum entity "know" whether the other hole is open or closed.              
Non locality is even more dramatically shown by another experiment known as the             
Aspect experiment. This experiment according to Alain Aspect, who lead the group            
performing the experiment and John Bell who developed Bell's Theorem a           
substantial part of the theory behind the Aspect experiment, shows that either the             
idea of non locality applies, which is contrary to the theory of special relativity as it                
involves faster than light signaling, or we drop the view of an external world that is                
independent of our observations and adopt an observer dependent world. (Davies &            
Brown (ed), 1986, 43 & 48). Obviously the problem here is that the theory of               
special relativity has tremendous experimental support so it should not be lightly            
dropped and the ideas of a world external to our senses is the common sense view                
of the world and so it should not be lightly dropped. But one of these needs to be                  
discarded. 
The last problem identified by Gribbin concerns the Schrodinger’s cat          
thought experiment, which illustrates the key role the observer plays in the            
quantum world and the relationship between the quantum and macro worlds. In the             
Schrodinger’s cat experiment a conscious observer is needed to bring everything in            
the experiment into existence. Without the observer everything remains suspended          
in limbo or in a superposition of states. The other point to emerge from the               
Schrodinger cat experiment is that the cat and the experiment do not exist until              
observed which is quite contrary to our normal common sense view of macro             
objects like cats. 
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A summary of the problems of quantum mechanics as seen by John            
Gribbin is wave/particle duality, for example why should quantum entities          
sometimes behave as particles and sometimes as waves, non locality, why is an             
observer​- necessary to make quantum entities real and why is there a difference             
between how things work in the quantum and macro worlds? 
Euan Squires in ​The Mystery of the Quantum World ​is mainly concerned            
with questions such as do quantum mechanical effects take place when measured            
or do they exist independent of measurement?; how does measurement take place?;            
whether conscious observers are necessary for measurement; how does         
measurement occur and is the wave function real and does it reduce? Squires             
illustrates these problems by reference to various experiments, one of which is the             
potential barrier experiment. In this experiment a particle of a certain velocity is             
directed against a barrier. On some occasions the particle will pass through the             
barrier (i.e. it is transmitted) by a process unique to the quantum world, known as               
tunneling. On other occasions the particle will not penetrate the barrier and will be              
reflected from the barrier. In this quantum mechanical situation, there is no way in              
which we can predict whether an individual particle will be transmitted or            
reflected, but we can describe the behavior of a lar​g​e number of such particles and               
assess the probability of any individual particle being transmitted or reflected. 
Squires uses another version of this experiment (in this case a thought            
experiment) to illustrate interference and non locality. This experiment involves          
using mirrors to deflect both the transmitted and reflected particles via different            
paths towards a set of detectors. This experiment is also a version of the double slit                
experiment in that the two beams of particles interfere to produce the interference             
pattern of alternative light and dark patches on the detectors. Non locality is             
illustrated when one of the mirrors is removed so there is only a single beam of                
particles and the interference pattern disappears, suggesting that somehow the          
particles knew that one of the mirrors had been removed. 
A fuller description of non locality is given by Squires when examining the             
EPR/Aspect experiment. This experiment began as a thought experiment proposed          
by Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen and became capable of being carried out in             
principle due to the work of John Bell who considerably refined and developed the              
experiment. Eventually the experiment was carried out in practice the most           
complete version of the experiment being carried out by Alain Aspect. The result             
of the EPR/Aspect experiments is usually considered to leave us with a choice of              
giving up locality and accepting faster than light signaling or giving up realism, the              
belief that things and their properties exist independent of observers. 
Overall it is apparent that while the literature describes the puzzles           
quantum mechanics provides us in a variety of ways, there nevertheless is a degree              
of agreement as to what the puzzles are. There is however much disagreement as              
to how to interpret and understand the results of those experiments that provide us              
with our quantum mechanical puzzles. 
 
The answers to the problems of Quantum Mechanics 
 
What explanations are given for the behavior of quantum systems? The           
orthodox explanation is the Copenhagen interpretation. The Copenhagen        
interpretation has a number of different versions each providing a different           
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emphasis on the varying aspects of the explanations of the puzzles produced by             
experiments such as the double slit experiment. The Copenhagen interpretation has           
a number of aspects such as the collapse of the wave function, the uncertainty              
principle and complementarity. 
The collapse of the wave function is a process which occurs whenever an             
observation or measurement is made of a quantum entity. The wave function is not              
a real wave like waves in the ocean. Rather the wave function is an abstract               
mathematical concept representing, “a complex form of vibration in an imaginary           
mathematical space called configuration space.” (Gribbin, 1984, 116). The picture          
of physically real waves in quantum mechanics is wrong, (Gribbin, 1984, 117) the             
waves are simply mathematical concepts based on probability. The mathematics          
produced by the wave function can be provided in a non-wave manner by the              
quantum algebra produced by Paul Dirac and the matrix mechanics produced by            
Heisenberg, Born and Jordan. (Gribbin, 1984, 114). The wave function, based on            
work by Erwin Schrodinger and Max Born provides a measure of the probability of              
finding a particular particle at any given place. In the double slit experiment a              
given electron may be anywhere in the universe, but it is more likely to turn up in                 
the dark patches of an interference pattern. 
The uncertainty principle concerns the impossibility of obtaining precise         
measurements of certain pairs of properties of quantum entities. The example           
usually given is that of the position and momentum of an electron, the principle              
stating the more precisely we try to measure the position of an electron the less               
precisely we will be able to measure its momentum. The principle is sometimes             
explained on the basis that the only way we can observe an electron’s position is by                
bouncing photons off it, which will tell us the electron's position. However the             
collision between the photon and the electron will disturb the electron's momentum            
making it impossible to measure both position and momentum at the same time. 
This however is not the full story. The mathematics of quantum theory            
make it clear that electrons and other quantum entities simply do not have a precise               
position and a precise momentum. It may have a precise position but then it will               
not have any knowable momentum at all, or it may have a precise momentum, but               
its position will not be knowable. (Gribbin, 1984, 157). 
Complementarity is simply the idea that the quantum world can be seen in             
alternate ways. One can for example see it in terms of waves by performing the               
double slit experiment or in terms of particles by placing detectors at the slits. Both               
the wave view and the particle view are necessary to understand the quantum             
world. They can be seen as different sides of the same coin. Any experiment              
designed to show waves, will show waves, any experiment designed to show            
particles will show particles, however no experiment will be able to show both             
wave and particle pictures of the quantum world at the same time. It should be               
mentioned however that an experiment has been performed in Japan which shows            
the same photons acting as both wave and particle at the same time. (Gribbin,              
1995, 119-120). 
The consequences of the Copenhagen interpretation is that the observer          
plays a critical role in determining how the world is. The behavior of atoms,              
electrons and light depends on whether an observation is being made. If it is, then               
the wave function collapses and they behave as particles. If no observation is made,              
then electrons, atoms and light behave as waves as is shown by the phenomena of               
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interference in the double slit experiment. The waves however are probability           
waves which do not have any material form; they are just mathematical concepts.             
Heinz Pagels in ​The Cosmic Code ​states "There is no meaning to the objective              
existence of an electron at some point in space, for example, at one of the two                
holes, independent of actual observation. The electron seems to spring into           
existence as a real object only when we observe it". (Pagels, 1982, 144 ) Based on                
the results of the double slit experiments Niels Bohr, the most prominent proponent             
of the Copenhagen interpretation, considered that whether you get waves or           
particles depends on the whole experimental set up including the electrons, atoms            
or light, the holes, the detector screen and the human observer. If you set up the                
experiment in different ways (eg one or two slits open, detectors at one or other of                
the two holes, or no detector at the holes, deciding to have the detectors on or off                 
after the electrons or photons have gone through the holes) you will get different              
results. (Gribbin, 1995, 14). 
An alternative to the Copenhagen interpretation is the "many worlds          
interpretation" invented by Hugh Everett. The many worlds interpretation presents          
a view of the universe that involves many worlds (probably an infinite number of              
them) existing across time and parallel to our own world but totally cut off from it.                
Everett accepted the existence of wave functions, but instead of the wave function             
collapsing whenever a measurement took place, a different world would come into            
existence for each possible outcome of the measurement process. If there are two             
possible outcomes of a measurement then two separate worlds will come into            
existence both virtually identical except that one will contain one outcome of the             
measurement process and the other the other outcome. This involves a continual            
proliferation of worlds, new worlds continually being created every time an event            
takes place with worlds branching out from ​previous worlds like the branches of a              
tree. Each world is completely separate from all the other worlds and any person in               
a world will be totally unaware of the existence of all the other worlds. In the                
Schrodinger's cat thought experiment, instead of there being one cat being neither            
dead or alive, there are two cats each in a different world, one cat being alive and                 
the other one being dead. The many worlds interpretation has its critics mostly             
concerning the vast and possibly infinite number of worlds that exist under this             
interpretation. Amongst them is John Wheeler, Everett’s supervisor and early          
supporter who now considers the theory has too much "metaphysical baggage".           
(Gribbin, 1984, 245). 
A further alternative to the Copenhagen interpretation is the “transactional          
interpretation” of quantum mechanics developed by John Cramer in the 1980's.           
This interpretation involves waves traveling both forwards and backwards in time.           
The transactional analysis applies to both the double slit experiment and the            
EPR/Aspect experiment. In the delayed choice double slit experiment a series of            
single photons goes through the experiment to arrive at a detector screen to build              
up an interference pattern. However the detector screen can be flipped down to             
reveal a pair of detectors focused one on each of the two slits. If this is done the                  
photons will be seen passing through one or other of the slits and no interference               
pattern is produced. The detector screen can be flipped down after the photons have              
passed through the slits so whether they behave as a wave and show interference or               
as particles with no interference is actually determined by an event (the flipping             
down or not of the detector screen) that occurs after the photons behavior has been               
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decided. Cramer explains this as an “offer wave” traveling through both holes of             
the experiment and if the detector screen is up it is absorbed in the detector screen                
and causes another “confirmation wave” to travel back, and backwards in time,            
from the detector screen through both slits back to the light sources. The waves              
travel through both slits and produce interference on the detector screen. If the             
detector screen is flipped down the offer wave reaches the detectors focused one on              
each slit. As each detector is focused on only one slit the confirmation wave that is                
sent back in time from the detector to the source can travel only through the slit the                 
detector is focused on and as the source can only accept one confirmation wave              
back at a time, we have the situation where the photons, passing through a single               
slit, must act as particles. 
Cramer's explanation of the EPR/Aspect experiment is that the atom which           
is about to emit the two photons sends out offer waves in various directions              
corresponding to various states of polarization. The offer waves are received by            
detectors who send confirmation waves back in time to the emitting atom. Only if              
the confirmation waves allow a particular polarization correlation between the two           
photons about to be emitted will the atom actually emit the photons. This ensures              
that the polarization of the photons will co-relate as is shown by the Aspect              
experiment. Otherwise the emission of the photons will simply not take place. 
As with all explanations of quantum mechanics the transactional         
interpretation has its weird features. Quantum waves traveling backwards in time           
are contrary to common sense and suggests that events may precede their causes.             
Cramer suggests there may be some effects that may precede causes such as             
confirmation waves returned by detectors back in time, to a source after having             
received offer waves, the whole process taking place atemporally. A further           
problem with the transactional analysis is that it appears to be contrary to notions              
of freewill in that every photon emitted has its future settled for it. 
Squires, in ​The Mystery of the Quantum World​, does not come up with a              
firm answer to the problems quantum theory poses for us. He is a firm realist and                
accepts non-locality as an essential element in quantum theory in preference to the             
idea of observers collapsing wave functions. 
David Lindley's answer to the one real problem he considers quantum           
mechanics provides us, the measurement problem, concerns the phenomena of          
decoherence. Decoherence is the tendency for complex physical systems to move           
from coherent states to mixed states. He gives the example of fifty yellow peas in a                
box with one thousand green peas. The yellow peas are in a particular corner of the                
box but if the box is shaken the peas will become mixed up. Continual shaking will                
cause the peas to go from one mixed state to another, but there will be almost no                 
chance the shaking will cause the peas to return to their original state with the fifty                
yellow peas in a particular corner of the box. This shows the tendency of complex               
macro physical systems made up of vast numbers of quantum systems, such as             
atoms and electrons, to move from coherent states to mixed states. Continual            
shaking of the box will simply move the peas from one mixed state to another, but                
is almost certainly not going to move the peas back to their original coherent state. 
Lindley applies the idea of decoherence to the problem of Schrodinger's           
cat. The quantum state of a cat involves a specification of the state of every atom                
and electron making up the cat. Whether the cat is alive or dead is not a quantum                 
state, but all possible quantum states of the cat can be divided into one set for the                 
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dead cat, and one set for the live cat. The quantum state of the cat, whether dead or                  
alive, is constantly changing as atoms and electrons randomly interact and move            
around. Lindley also claims we cannot tell from any of the quantum states, whether              
the cat is alive or dead, but as an empirical fact we are able to tell whether the cat is                    
dead or alive. 
Lindley suggests that when the electron spin is measured in the           
Schrodinger's cat experiment and when the poison is or is not released into the box,               
the cat enters into a superposition of live and dead states. However as the atoms               
and electrons are constantly on the move, the superposition will keep changing, the             
superposition for the live state changing to another superposition for a live state             
and so on and the superposition for the dead state changing to another             
superposition for a dead state and then on to another and so on. Over time a vast                 
number of different superpositions will represent both the live and dead cat. To             
find out the probability of the cat being alive it would be necessary to average all                
the possible live superpositions of the cat. Equally to find the probability of the cat               
being dead it would be necessary to average all the possible dead superpositions of              
the cat. However to calculate the probability of the cat being both dead and alive it                
is necessary to do a mixed average over both the live and dead superpositions and               
these superpositions cancel each other out as they completely at random adopt all             
possible values. This means there is some probability of the cat being alive, some              
probability of the cat being dead and no probability of' the cat being both alive and                
dead. The disappearance of the probability of the cat being both alive and dead is               
caused by the process of decoherence. At the moment of the measurement of the              
electron spin the cat assumes a coherent alive and dead state but due to the random                
motion of the atoms and electrons constituting the cat the coherence is lost and the               
cats quantum state evolves into quantum states that represent a live cat or a dead               
cat, but not a cat that is both alive and dead. This of course is how we imagine that                   
cats should be. This also explains how measurements can be made in quantum             
mechanics. Complex macroscopic measuring devices, such as cats, Geiger counters          
and polarization meters evolve from a superposition of states into particular states            
from which they are able to carry out measurements of the quantum world. 
Quantum logic arises from a belief that the paradoxes of quantum           
mechanics are caused by our attempt to impose classical logic on the quantum             
world. If we could find the right logic to use when dealing with the quantum world                
it may be that the paradoxes will dissolve. The supporters of quantum logic tend to               
compare quantum logic with non-Euclidean geometry pointing out that our          
empirical experience of physics has led us to adopt non-Euclidean geometry and            
equally our empirical experience of quantum mechanics should lead us to abandon            
classical logic and adopt quantum logic. They claim logic is something we learn             
empirically rather than something that exists prior to experience. Quantum logic           
comes in a variety of forms, some saying it applies to both macro and quantum               
worlds, others suggesting it just applies to the quantum world. 
In quantum logic the connectives are the same as for classical logic, but             
unlike classical logic, quantum logic does not use the distributive law. The use of              
quantum logic allows mechanical realism; quantum entities exist and they have           
determinate qualities prior to measurement. Quantum logic can be applied to the            
paradoxes of the double slit experiment by denying the use of the distributive law              
in an argument for quantum logic which Gibbins says attempts to dissolve the             
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paradoxes in the sense of avoiding the wrong answer to the double slit experiments              
paradoxes, but does not provide a right answer to those paradoxes. More            
particularly, Gibbins considers this solution does not work, even if the distributive            
law is not used in analyzing the double slit experiment. Gibbins also questions the              
claim that the connectives mean the same in quantum and classical logic. 
On the other hand Gibbins does consider quantum logic to be a legitimate             
logic which can be applied to the quantum world but not to the macro world. This                
however still leaves a problem as how to account for the cut between the macro               
and the quantum worlds. Furthermore quantum lo​g​ic, so far as it works, does not              
dissolve the paradoxes of quantum mechanics; they are simply not formulable in            
quantum logic. 
It seems quite apparent that whatever explanation one accepts for the           
extraordinary behavior of quantum entities one is inevitably required to accept an            
explanation that seems weird. Quantum logic would appear to eliminate any trace            
of conventional rationality from quantum mechanics. Quantum mechanics is meant          
to be a science and the use of quantum logic would destroy quantum mechanics as               
a science. It ​is hardly allowable to use a new logic just because the result of                
experiments seem odd. If quantum logic could be used in quantum mechanics, it is              
hard to tell why quantum logic or any other logic should not be used in any other                 
area of science and if any logic can be used in any area of science, then you may                  
get results which would destroy any chance of science giving us any understanding             
of the world. As Heinz Pagels suggests adopting quantum logic is like inventing a              
new logic to show the earth is flat, when provided with evidence that it is round.                
(Pagels, 1982, 167). Anything we don't like we just adopt a new logic to get rid of                 
it. 
The many worlds theory also has its weird aspects. Countless universes,           
constantly being created due to quite trivial events, such as an electron going             
through one slit or another in the double slit experiment or whether a particle              
tunnels or does not tunnel in the barrier experiment seems weird. Such endless             
creation of worlds positively invites the use of Occam’s razor. 
The transactional interpretation involves waves traveling backwards in        
time and events preceding their causes. This is obviously contrary to our normal             
view of the world and seems impossible. 
The Copenhagen interpretation itself has obvious weird aspects. The view          
that an act of observation brings the world into existence, the impossibility of             
measuring certain co-related properties of quantum entities such as the position and            
momentum of particles are all contrary to our normal experience of the world.             
Lindley's decoherence explanation for how we are able to make measurements of            
the quantum world accepts observer dependence and the uncertainty principle in           
the quantum world and indeterminism for macro objects for the brief moment            
before decoherence takes place. His explanation involves all the peculiarities of the            
Copenhagen interpretation. 
It appears all explanations for the quantum world involve weirdness. As           
David Lindley suggests you can push the weirdness round by adopting one view or              
another, but you cannot get rid of it (Lindley, 1996, 121, 124). All interpretations              





Misunderstandings of  Idealist Philosophy and the Observer Dependent Universe 
 
One aspect common to a number of the publications that contributes to the             
perceived weirdness of quantum mechanics, is a misunderstanding of idealist          
philosophy and the observer dependent universe. In ​The Mystery of the Quantum            
World ​Euan Squires considers that the fact that he can close his eyes and then               
reopen them and see essentially the same scene shows the existence of an external              
reality independent of the observer. This does not show there is an external reality              
independent of the observer. This is what J. S Mill called the permanent possibility              
of perception. It is perfectly possible that Squires was seeing sense perceptions            
without there being any independent external reality behind them, both before he            
closed his eyes and after he reopened them. It simply does not follow from that               
sense perceptions are consistent over time, to the world that we perceive is an              
external world, independent of the observer. The world we perceive can still be             
observer dependent, regardless of it being consistent over time.  
He also suggests that because he is able to perceive the same objects with               
different senses, this shows the objects exist as part of a real world, independent of               
the observer. This is Dr Samuel Johnson’s mistake, as recounted by his biographer             
James Boswell, when Dr Johnson sought to refute Berkeley’s arguments for           
idealism by kicking a large stone and one supposes getting a sore foot. Coherence              
among our sense perceptions does not show there is a world independent of             
observers as it is perfectly possible that the visual sensation of the stone and the               
foot feeling the stone are both sense perceptions. Adding two sense perceptions,            
from different senses, together does not equal an independent reality, it just gives             
you additional sense perceptions. Our senses evolved to keep us alive and as a              
result they work together to help us avoid predators and to find food. Rotten food,               
for example, will often look, smell, taste and feel different from good food. Our              
senses work together to keep us alive, but this does not mean the world we perceive                
is an external world independent of the observer. 
Squires third and fourth arguments concern his perception of other people            
who appear to be similar to him and that they communicate with him and they say                
they see very much the same world that he sees. Idealist philosophers would             
answer that Squires sees other people similar to himself just means that he has              
obtained additional sense perceptions and that these people say they see a similar             
world to his merely shows that conscious beings with similar sensory apparatus            
will obtain a similar view of the world. This does not mean there is an external                
reality independent of the observer. All the people may simply be perceiving            
similar sense perceptions because they have a similar sensory apparatus. 
Squires considers these arguments naturally point to an external reality          
independent of the observer and cannot be explained without such a reality.            
(Squires, 1986, 5-6). However all these arguments are just as consistent with the             
view of an observer dependent external reality as they are with an independent             
external reality. 
The same mistake is made by Alastair Rae in ​Quantum Physics: Illusion or             
Reality. ​He suggests that as different observers agree in their description of            
external reality, the idea of the physical world not having an objective existence             
appears unreasonable. He gives the example of people driving cars at traffic lights,             
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where the drivers all receive the same sensory impressions of red and green lights.              
He suggests that it is much more likely that the lights really exist than by               
coincidence the driver’s brains and consciousness all change in similar ways so            
they all stop and go at the right time. (Rae, 1986, 68). This is a false dichotomy.                 
There is another explanation, that as all the drivers have very similar sensory             
apparatus, they all see the lights in the same way, so they will all stop and go at the                   
right time so there will be no accidents. All the drivers are simply seeing very               
similar sense perceptions due to the drivers all having a very similar sensory             
apparatus. The traffic lights argument simply does not mean there is an external             
reality independent of the observers. It is perfectly consistent with an observer            
dependent external reality. 
A further point of confusion relates to the consequences of giving up the             
idea of an observer independent universe. Bernard d'Espagnat suggests to do so            
would trivialize science. It would reduce science "to a set of​- recipes for predicting,              
future observation from a knowledge of past ones. Any notion of science "as the              
study of nature is impossible; nature is a phantom" (Scientific American,           
November 1979, 139). Such a science could predict all possible correlations of            
events and still leave the world totally incomprehensible. 
David Lindley in ​Where does the Weirdness Go? suggests many criticisms           
of the Copenhagen interpretation concern the Copenhagenist view that the world is            
observer dependent. He also suggests that this seems to make the world a matter of               
our whim and fancy. He quotes Roger Penrose as suggesting that the Copenhagen             
interpretation will "turn the foundations of science to sand". (Lindley, 1997, 158). 
Nick Herbert in ​Quantum Reality ​considers you could only deny reality if            
you went all the way and considered macroscopic objects (including measuring           
devices) were not really there. He considers Berkeley did not believe in the             
existence of mountains, apples or polarization meters and it is necessary to cease to              
believe in such macroscopic objects if you want to consider the quantum world to              
be observer dependent (Herbert, 1985, 236). 
One thing needs to be understood. Berkeley did not doubt the existence of             
mountains, apples and polarization meters. Well maybe polarization meters as they           
did not exist when he was around. He did however believe in physical objects.              
Berkeley’s arguments did not relate to the existence of such objects, but to the              
nature of the objects. Berkeley considered these objects to be mental entities and             
that they were not composed of matter. It was the existence of matter that he               
denied, rather than the existence of objects. Berkeley's idea of matter was not the              
same as that of modern scientists. 
A further point is that an observer dependent universe is not a universe of              
ghosts, phantoms, illusions and randomness. An observer dependent universe can          
be considered to be a physical, solid, tangible universe with coherence and            
consistency. Properties such as physicality, solidity and tangibility are given to us            
by our sensory apparatus, that is how we know about them. The physical properties              
of objects can be every bit as much a part of an observer dependent universe as an                 
observer independent universe. Anti Copenhagen interpretation and anti observer         
dependent universe arguments are knocking down a straw man when they imply            
the observer dependent universe is a random, ghostly, phantom, incoherent world.           
They are not referring to the real observer dependent universe. 
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Closing your eyes and then reopening them again to view the same scene             
and perceiving the same object with different senses and perceiving the same or             
similar world as other members of the same species equipped with similar sensory             
apparatus do not mean the world we perceive is independent of us. Modern             
research into other species' senses make it plain that other species perceive worlds             
greatly different from the human sensory world and yet their worlds are as valid              
and true as our world is. Given that we have acquired our sensory apparatus              
through a process of biological evolution, just as all other species have acquired             
their sensory apparatus, there does not seem to be any reason to regard the human               
view of the world as truer or more real than that of any other animal. Animals of                 
different species will each live in different sensory worlds as they all have different              
sensory apparatus. Each animal species sensory apparatus will be directed at its            
own ecological niche and are designed to help it navigate, find mates, find food and               
avoid predators. Each species view of the world will be consistent over time, its              
senses will work together giving it a coherent view of the world and different              
animals of the same species will perceive a very similar view of its species world.               
However each species world will be different from other species worlds and this is              
a clear example of the universe being observer dependent. This shows how the             
universe is observer dependent and also consistent over time and with coherence            
between the senses and with agreement between members of the same species as to              
what is happening in the world. Each species world would have consistency,            
coherence and agreement among species members as to the contents and events of             
the world and yet it is still an observer dependent world. 
In the third edition of ​Sense Perception and Reality : A theory of              
perceptual relativity, quantum mechanics and the observer dependent universe         
PhilPapers and ​Sense Perception and Reality : A theory of perceptual relativity,            
quantum mechanics and the observer dependent universe Humanities Commons,         
on pages 14-15  I state: 
“There are millions of different animal species on this planet. Each species            
sees the same thing in different ways. This suggests there is no single, true, real               
view of what is being observed and no particular form in which what is being               
observed, can exist in when it is not being observed. Each of the many different               
views, different species can have, can only come into existence when an            
observation is made. Before the observation is made, the particular view seen by an              
observer is not seen by anyone, so it does not exist. The particular view will               
continue only for so long as an observer keeps observing. Once the observation             
stops the particular view will disappear as no other being will see the particular              
point in space-time in that particular way. This means that things will only come              
into existence when they are observed and must acquire their properties, such as             
shape, size and colour, only when they are observed. If something exists            
independent of an observation, in what form does it exist? The form in which a               
human perceives it, or the form an antelope, dog, bat, snake, bird, frog or insect               
perceives it? All these animals will see a particular thing in a variety of different               
ways and some may not perceive it at all. 
If something exists independent of observation, does it have the colours           
that some animals will see it possessing or colours other animals will see it having,               
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or is it black and white as other animals will perceive it? Surely a thing cannot be                 
of one set of colours and another set of colours and black and white at the same                 
time. The only situation where something can be of alternative sets of colours, or              
black and white, at the same time, is where it is observed at that time by different                 
observers whose sensory apparatus will give it different appearances. But if there            
are no observers and no sensory apparatus you cannot have something being of             
different colours or black and white at the same time. So it is hard to see how                 
anything can exist unless it is observed. What you see may well exist in some form                
when not observed, but it certainly does not exist in the form in which you see it, as                  
that form is created by your sensory apparatus, and if the sensory apparatus is not               
working then, what you see ceases to exist. 
The arguments given in the previous paragraphs are very strong so I will             
restate them in a slightly different form. Some animals can see only in black and               
white, so everything is a shade of grey, others can see in various colours. If you                
cease to look at something and it continues to exist, what color does it have? The                
color one species sees it in, or the color another species sees it in? Clearly it can’t                 
be grey and have another color at the same time. The same applies to other sense                
perceptions, a vibration in the air sounds different to different species, the same             
odour can smell different to different species. Remove the observer, what sound or             
smell continues to exist? The way one observer hears the sound or the way the               
other observer hears it? Does an odour continue to exist the way one observer              
smells it or the way another smells it? Something cannot be of different colors,              
smells or sounds at the same time. Clearly the sense perceptions a particular             
observer has disappear when the observer ceases to be making an observation. 
The problem is most people have a human centric view of the world and              
think everything exists in the form humans perceive it and continues to exist in that               
form when there is no human observer. But there are millions of other views every               
bit as valid as ours. Why should something continue to exist in the form a human                
sees it and not in the form other species see it? There seems to be no way we can                   
justify a belief that the human view of the world is so special that it continues when                 
there is no observer, while other species' views of the world disappear. 
When we say things don’t exist unless observed, it means they don’t exist             
in the human sensory world. They may exist in other species worlds and possibly              
in other forms quite different from any species world. Our normal ideas of             
existence are too simplistic; there are multiple ways in which things can exist and              
multiple worlds they can exist in. The human sensory world is only one such              
world. Tables, trees and people only exist in the human sensory world when             
observed with the human sensory apparatus. 
Each species has its own sensory world, which are often very different            
from each other species sensory world. There is some overlap between these            
worlds but there are many aspects of one species world which will be completely              
unknown to members of other species. The human view of the world is only one               
view and is no more valid than that of any other species.” 
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The senses of all animals arose through a process of biological evolution,            
each directed at a particular ecological niche and they are designed to help us              
survive and breed. They are not designed to provide us with a true view of the                
universe as that would involve giving us a vast amount of unnecessary information,             
not relevant to our survival as a species. There is a cost in terms of energy in                 
providing a perceiver with information about the world around them and as a result              
only information relevant to survival and breeding is provided by the senses.            
Information not relevant to species survival within its particular ecological niche is            
simply not provided and this is an enormously greater amount of information than             
we obtain through our senses. 
The issue as to what effect an observer dependent reality would have is             
discussed by David Lindley in ​Where does the Weirdness Go? ​He distinguishes            
between what he calls weak objectivity (the observer dependent world) where all            
scientists doing the same experiments will get the same results, and strong            
objectivity (the observer independent world) where scientific experiments all show          
the same underlying reality which exists independently of any observation made of            
it. Lindley notes that weak objectivity is essential to the functioning of science; it is               
the minimum standard that scientists must accept in order to do their work. Going              
beyond weak objectivity to strong objectivity is unnecessary, but strong objectivity           
is an assumption traditionally made in classical physics, but is not demanded by             
classical physics. The jump from weak to strong objectivity is a leap of faith, rather               
than of scientific necessity. (Lindley, 1997, 159-161). It seems the acceptance of            
the idea of an observer dependent reality may not be a disaster for science at all. 
 
Similarities between the Idealist macro world and the Copenhagen Interpretation 
 
The idea of an observer dependent universe can be a positive asset to             
science. It provides an explanation for many scientific puzzles. The Copenhagen           
interpretation of quantum mechanics has extraordinary similarities with some         
idealist interpretations of the macro world as suggested in my papers ​Sense            
Perception and Reality and the ​Philosophy of Perception​. This interpretation of the            
macro world suggests what is observed depends upon the sensory apparatus used to             
observe it, the conditions of observation and the point in spacetime that is             
observed. This seems to be much like Bohr’s statements that when observing the             
quantum world you had to take into account the whole experimental set up,             
including the observer. Altering the experimental set up is the same as altering the              
sensory apparatus and conditions of observation in the macro world. 
The idealist macro world view that things don’t exist until an observation            
is made seems very much the same as the Copenhagen interpretation view that             
quantum entities such as photons and electrons only come into existence when an             
observation is made. Equally properties such as colours only come into existence in             
the macro world when an observation is made and properties such as photon             
polarization and electron spin only come into existence in the quantum world when             
an observation is made. If tables, trees, people and everything else in the human              
sensory macro world only come into existence when observed, then our           
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observations of the effects in our experiments that tell us of the presence of              
quantum entities must also only come into existence when an observation is made.             
How could it be otherwise? as our observations of the results of our experiments              
are macro level observations seen in our macro level experimental apparatus and            
come to us via our sensory apparatus. It is not in the quantum world, or the                
experimental apparatus, that the explanation for quantum entities only existing          
when observed can be seen. It is the way the human sensory apparatus creates the               
human sensory world that causes quantum entities, as shown by the effects in             
macro level experimental apparatus, to come into existence and acquire their           
properties. This may possibly solve the quantum measurement problem. 
Perceptual relativity is the idea that the world appears different to different            
observers. Perceptual relativity, as suggested in my paper ​Quantum Measurement          
Problem: Collapse of the Wave Function explained​, applies in the macro world but             
wave/particle duality suggests it also applies in the quantum world and           
complementarity is arguably just another name for perceptual relativity. 
The veil of perception in the macro world is the problem that we are              
unable to get past the limitations of our senses to see how things really are. The                
uncertainty principle in the quantum world looks very much like an example of             
how we cannot get past the veil of perception. There are limits to what we can                
perceive in both macro and quantum worlds so the veil of perception can be              
considered to apply in both worlds. 
In quantum theory we are often considered as only obtaining a snapshot by             
snapshot or observation by observation view of the quantum world. This is a view              
without any continuity which is considered to be different from the macro world             
where we have continuity. In the macro world we see by reflected light, by photon               
after photon which gives an appearance of continuity, but is not really continuous.             
We get a view similar to watching TV which appears continuous but we know can               
be slowed down to a frame by frame view where we can see there is no continuity.                 
The appearance of continuity in the macro world, sometimes known as the            
persistence of vision, is caused by the workings of our sensory apparatus which             
gives apparent continuity, but in reality photons reach our sensory apparatus one by             
one so there is discontinuity in the macro world as well as the quantum world, even                
though in the macro world the discontinuity is hidden from us. 
The external points of reference Bohr considered we have in the macro            
world such as space, time and causality are just creations of our sensory apparatus              
and a different sensory apparatus would not have available those points of            
reference. General relativity shows space is a different shape for different           
observers, special relativity shows time passing at different speeds for different           
observers and it is never possible to prove causality. This means that both the              
macro world and the quantum world exist without any external points of reference             
and both are observer dependent and there is no need for a dividing line between               
the two worlds. 
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The Copenhagen interpretation has long been the orthodox view of the           
quantum world and this is not surprising considering how weird the alternatives            
are. However realism has usually been assumed in the macro world as shown by              
some of the books referred to in this paper. But, given modern research into animal               
senses, neurology and cognitive psychology, realism must inevitably cease to be a            
serious explanation of the macro world. It seems quite obvious the macro world is              
observer dependent and the orthodox interpretation of the quantum world          
postulates an observer dependent world as well. This suggests the same rules can             
apply to both the macro and quantum worlds, which eliminates the need for a              
dividing line between the two worlds. 
The first paragraph of this paper suggested the quantum world was weird            
and not really understandable. This is because we tended to compare it with the              
macro world and it seemed very different from the macro world. But we have              
misunderstood the macro world and when we come to understand the macro world             
as an observer dependent world, the quantum world does not appear weird at all. 
The debate between an observer dependent world and an observer          
independent world is analogous to two debates in the history of astronomy. The             
first debate was between the geocentric and heliocentric views of our solar system.             
The geocentric view was the intuitive common sense view as the Earth was             
obviously not moving according to our human senses. However if you dig deeper             
and look at all the evidence you will find the Earth is moving, both orbiting the Sun                 
and spinning on its axis. The same situation exists with the observer dependent or              
independent external world. The common sense intuitive view is of a world            
independent of the observer, but if you dig deeper and look at all the available               
evidence the world we observe is clearly observer dependent. 
The second debate concerns the shape of space and the passage of time.             
The intuitive common sense view is that we live in flat three dimensional space as               
was believed throughout human history until the twentieth century. However if you            
dig deeper and look at all the available evidence you find in accordance with              
general relativity we live in a world of four dimensional curved spacetime. The             
intuitive common sense view of time is that it passes at a steady and consistent rate                
but if you dig deeper you find that in accordance with special relativity and time               
dilation, time varies with the speed of the observer. 
The idea the world is observer dependent is quite counter intuitive but the             
evidence we have supports it. An examination of the way other animal senses work              
and the recognition that their worlds are different from ours but are just as valid               
and true as ours inevitably leads to the conclusion the world we observe and live in                
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